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June 6, 1813 Helmuth Von Moltke used to say that no military plan survives the first few minutes of contact with the enemy. Stoney Creek was a unique battle of brilliant plans, terrible execution, good luck, bad luck, worse luck and terrible luck. Things when wrong from the very start; first, after a brilliant landing, the America army spent a week sitting at Ft. George. The British mistake was retreating south towards Queenston Heights, rather than east. American forces were then sent east to cut off all supplies and the only route of retreat for the British. A complete victory seemed on the wind . . . then Gen. Dearborn recalled the advance party, allowing the British to escape east, withdrawing from all their forts along the Niagara River. The Native Americans, fearing a major defeat, abandoned their British allies and stood off at a distance, waiting to see the results of the upcoming battle. The British now numbered 1,700 to about 6,000 Americans. Still the chance for victory remained high for the US; during the retreat almost all the British ammunition and food had to be abandoned on the rain-soaked roads. Yet the American Army of the Centre did nothing. The British were able to send out parties to recover their supplies and were left unmolested to dig in on Burlington Heights . . . all without any interference. The American Navy was in full control of the lake and then it withdrew to defend Sackett's Harbor. Still the way to victory was open and the American Staff created a brilliant plan to destroy the British army. Although it would be difficult to throw the British off of Burlington Heights without high casualties, the British could be easily outflanked. Burlington Beach is a long spit of land that crosses the lake to the east of Burlington Heights and ends at the only main road heading east. The American army decided to bypass the British army and cross Burlington Beach occupying the ground to the east of the heights, which most likely would have compelled the British to surrender. To accomplish this superb plan two of the least competent senior officers in the American army were assigned to it: Brig. Gens. Winder and Chandler. Both officers were fast talking politicians who had received commands as political appointments. Both were newly minted generals who had no experience and had only joined the army in 1812. Both were looking for nothing more than easy victories that would catapult them to higher office after the war. The most charitable thing said about Chandler was that if he was given the chance to be a company officer for a year or so he might have become an adequate Brigadier General. Chandler would show no improvement in his military capabilities as the war dragged on; Winder would actually get worse as the war progressed. The American Army was about to snatch defeat from victory. Engagement at Davis Tavern The American advance towards Burlington Beach was slow. Moving wagons on the muddy roads took eight . . . not the usual four . . . horses. Most of the supplies were moved by small boats which had to be rowed from creek to creek. As the route forked between the heights and the beach the American army encountered small British patrols, they killed one American dragoon and drove a larger group off. The Americans panicked. Chandler sent a large party of infantry to drive off what he thought was a major attack by Native American forces. A infantry company of the US 2nd Artillery regiment drove the British back at Davis Tavern, but as night began to fall, they withdrew back to Stoney Creek, were the closest supply boats had put in for the night. When they arrived at the Gage farm, Winder and Chandler started making serious mistakes.
Now it was the British turn to create a brilliant plan. Up until sunset Vincent realized he might be cut off and was making plans to retreat up the lake, back towards Kingston. He then received reports of the poor layout of the American camp, and the fact that it was well lit but cooking fires. Vincent changed his plans. Rather than retreat he ordered a night attack on the poorly organized American camp. Although Vincent planned a night attack, he was still greatly outnumbered; he needed to achieve complete surprise for it to work. In the dark, a surprise attack would create the illusion that his forces were much larger than they were. This might allow them to send the Americans all the way back across the river. He ordered the men to leave their muskets unloaded and remove the flints . . . to prevent any nervous firing from alerting the Americans. The British would attack with bayonets fixed. This worked to Vincent's advantage in any case as they were critically short of ammunition. The stage was set for the next American military disaster.
The Battle British troops had no trouble sneaking right up to the American camp undetected. One trooper got off a single round before retiring as the British approached, but this was most likely ignored a the result of a single nervous sentry. Rather than running into more pickets, the first group of Americans the British ran into were cooks, working over their fires. Unarmed, these men fled quickly. The next group the British encountered was the 25th US Infantry and some light troops under Captain Hindman. Woken from their sleep, the men of the 25th were quickly routed. Capt. Peter Mills' of the 23rd was present in this forward line and Peter himself received a bayonet wound in the stomach that would take him out of the action. Now things began to go serious wrong for the British. The attack was designed to move forward silently, so as to take the camp by surprise. Perhaps because things were going so well, Vincent's staff started to cheer at the rout of the US 25th Regiment. That yell was soon taken up by many of the British rank and file. Within seconds the entire US camp was alerted to the presence of British troops. Without senior officers to lead them, US troops automatically gathered on the best defensive terrain available, a low ridge that ran across the farm bisected only by a single road. The lower slopes of the ridge were covered in bushes and low stumps, making a natural fence line, preventing the British from making a successful charge up the slope. The only clear way through the line was a road were four artillery pieces under Capt. Towson had been placed. American fire was at once heavy and intense, prompting the British to call out that they were American troops. Since Hindman's light troops, who were still well forward, had made the same claim, firing did stop briefly, but as the red uniforms of British troops could be clearly seen in the light from the cooking fires, US volleys resumed almost immediately. Now things started to go badly for the British. Without flints the British could not return fire. Grapeshot from Towson's 6-pounders were staring to rack up serious casualties and the wooded slope prevented the British bayonet charge from reaching the American line. At his point 30 men assembled to rush the American guns so the British could advance up the main road. The attack was a suicide mission. Then, at that very moment, enter Chandler . . . to save the day for the British. Chandler, concerned that Towson was firing on the 25th Infantry regiment, ordered the unit to stop firing. Just then the 30 man attack force reached the guns, capturing both them and the general. It's at this point that the 23rd regiment gets a bad combat report. Standing next to Towson's battery the regiment fired one round at the British band and then retired. At the same time however, Leonard's battery located behind the 23rd started to open fire. Several of the members of the 23rd regiment report casualties at this time in reports and memoirs as well as taking fire. Since the British troops were not carrying loaded muskets, had no artillery and none of the wounds were bayonet wounds, it seems likely that the casualties were caused by friendly fire from Leonard's battery firing at the captured guns. They may have mistaken the 23rd for British troops or they may simply have been in the way. In this light the withdrawal of the 23rd doesn't seem like the cowardly act of an untrained unit as reported by some of the American officers. It may have been a sensible military maneuver. In any case, the 23rd reassembled and charged Towson's battery to recapture the position. Unfortunately, this first charge was led by Winder. Once Winder and a platoon of the 23rd arrived they ran into a single sergeant armed only with a blood soaked bayonet. The sergeant approached Winder, who was armed with a sword and a loaded pistol . . . and backed up by a platoon of regulars . . . and stated: "If you stir, sir, you die." Winder immediately dropped his weapons and surrendered to this single soldier. At this point, with the British struggling to remove their prisoners and the captured guns, Vincent became lost in the local woods . . . or as his aide claimed many years later, simply wondered off in disgust. Leaderless, British troops were not able to exploit the gap in the America line and a second charge of the 23rd was able to recover two of the captured guns the British could not drag off. At this point, any competent senior officer could have lead the American army forward and captured the entire British force, but with both senior American commanders captured and no standing orders for their replacement in the event of death or incapacitation, the American army was out of senior officers. The next in line to command, Col. James Burn, as not even aware that the command was his until after dawn. The British sent a party to talk to the Americans to see if they had captured Vincent. No one on the American side had seen him. With all the major leaders now lost or captured, the battle simply ended; the British straggling back to Burlington Heights and the Americans milling around the Gage farm. The British army was broken and the American army's confidence was shattered.
Aftermath In the morning Col. John Chrystie, having heard the gun fire during the night, brought his regiments quickly to the Gage farm from the path to Burlington Beach where they had been camped. Chrystie tried to assume command and started an argument with Col. Burn of the 2nd Dragoons over the issue. Chrystie was stunned to find that Burn actually outranked him by having and earlier commission date. Chrystie wanted to pursue the British at once, but Burn . . . not being a particularly decisive officer and not prepared to be the de facto army commander . . . could not decide on a course of action. Having used up a fair amount of their ammunition Burn finally ordered the army to move back to Forty Mile Creek where the next group of the army's boats were anchored and additional supplies could be obtained. The rush to leave was so intense that the remaining supply wagons were burned and dead bodies remained unburied on the battlefield . . . even the 23rd's own Peter Mills was abandoned by the Regimental Surgeon, Silas Fuller on the field, to be captured by the British. Peter survived the mortal wound that was supposed to kill him and returned to duty with the 23rd in 1814.
The Great Cover Up Soon even the American press noted the great discrepancies between the reports coming out of the Battle of Stoney Creek. Burn reported only 30 dead and Dearborn sent that number to Washington, But almost all the units at the battle reported 20 dead each. Even the reports of British casualties to Kingston were lower that the count of dead bodies discovered at the site after the American withdrawal. Casualties may have been up to ten times that listed in the official reports. It seems neither side wanted to tell their superiors how badly things had really gone. It would cost both Dearborn and Vincent their positions.
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