| |
|
|
The Pearl Harbor of 1814 One of the causes of the disaster at Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a reluctance to recognize the danger. American commanders reasoned that Pearl Harbor was too far away to be attacked, the waters too shallow for torpedoes. In 1814 our Pearl Harbor was Washington DC. A city of grand design, but little substance. Military figures assumed that it was safe from attack. It was inland. The Potomac was difficult to navigate, having many shoals and sandbars. (The city itself was partially in a swamp . . . to give you an idea of the shallow waters) Baltimore was a better target. Washington had less than 100 buildings in it. On July 1, 1814 President Madison saw the danger (since the fall of Napoleon) and ordered Secretary of War John Armstrong to raise a force of 2,000 to 3,000 well-trained regulars and post them south of Washington. Madison was concerned that a spontaneous army of militiamen would have little hope of stopping a determined British army. John Armstrong, however, believed the British target would be Baltimore, not Washington. Yet Secretary of State Monroe writes this morning to Madison: The enemy are advancing six miles on the road to Wood Yard, and our troops are retiring. Our troops were on the march to meet them, but in too small a body. The enemy are in full march for Washington . . . You had better remove the records. Winder Takes Command In July 1814, John Armstrong appointed William Winder commander of the Tenth Military District (an officer who had surrendered at the first contact with the enemy) giving him command of all forces in the Washington/Baltimore area. The only problem was there were no forces. On July 4th Armstrong issued orders calling up 3,500 militia from Maryland, 6,000 militia from Pennsylvania, and authorized the transfer of 3,000 regulars to the Tenth Military District. By August 11th, Winder had one company of militia from Maryland, a letter stating that local political issues meant that none of the 6,000 Pennsylvania troops would be coming and only 250 regulars could be found. 5,000 British troops landed in Benedict Maryland on August 19th, target Washington. Monroe Lends a Hand 5,000 British troops landed in Benedict Maryland on August 19th, target Washington. On that very same day, Winder . . . Having almost no direct forces, got help from an unexpected quarter. A dozen dragoons left Washington to scout the situation. The group's commander . . . None other than Secretary of State James Monroe (Who also happened to be a Colonel in the Virginia militia)! After scouting the British camp, Monroe reported to General Winder's headquarters at Woodyard, south of Washington. Local troops were arriving, but they were ill prepared, disorganized and unable to find equipment and supplies. Panic was beginning to spread. It appeared that Winder would have only about 400 effectives to stop 5,000 British. The 1,800 arriving would be little more than spectators. The concept of the Minuteman arriving just in time to save Washington was collapsing before Monroe's eyes. A local farmer summed up Winder's chances: He'll be whipped. Commodore Joshua Barney's Account of the Battle of Bladensburg We took our position on the rising ground (American 3rd line) . . . and awaited the approach of the enemy, during this period the engagement continued the enemy advancing, our own Army retreating before them apparently in much disorder, at length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, and in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt, I reserved our fire, in a few minutes the enemy advanced, when I ordered an 18-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road, shortly after a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward but all were destroyed, the enemy then crossed over onto an open field and attempted to flank our right, he was there met by three 12-pounders, the Marines under Capt. Miller and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up, by this time not a vestige of the American Army remained except a body of 5 or 600 men posted on a height on my right from whom I expected much support , from their fine situation. The enemy from this point never appeared in force in front of us, they pushed forward their sharpshooters, one of which shot my horse under me, who fell dead between two of my guns; the enemy who had been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour now began to outflank us on the right, our guns were turned that way, he pushed up the hill, about 2 or 300 towards the corps of Americans stationed as above described, who, to my great mortification made no resistance, giving a fire or two and retired, in this situation we had the whole army of the enemy to contend with. Our Ammunition was expended, and unfortunately the drivers of my ammunition wagons had gone off in the general panic, at this time I received a severe wound in my thigh . . . finding the enemy now completely in our rear and no means of defense I gave orders to my officers and men to retire. Sent to Secretary of the Navy William Jones August 29, 1814.
|
|